I. Step 1: Musical Recordings Are Nonrival Goods
The fundamental good produced by the recording industry is literally a bit string, a long sequence of 0's and 1's. Like any nonrival good, it comes packaged together with rival goods. A rm can ship a bit string on CDs or transmit it over the Internet. Either delivery method requires rival goods: plastic disks and trucks in the rst case, computer servers and wires in the second. Additional units require additional delivery costs. However, once the bit string exists, it can be reused, at no additional cost, to make copies for millions, even billions, of people.
II. Step 2: The Nordhaus Trade-off for Musical Recordings
Music is attracting attention now because technological change has substantially undermined the effective protection offered by copyright. Anyone with a personal computer and an Internet connection can download music les and share them with others. Legal action against such intermediaries as Napster is unlikely to stop user-to-user exchanges. As a result, the recently proposed Security System Standards and Certi cation Act (SSSCA) would require that any "interactive digital device" (computer, handheld, set-top box, etc.) implement encryption standards set by hardware manufacturers and copyright-holders in consultation with the Secretary of the Department of Commerce.
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The relevant economic question is whether the net harm (if any) created by a shift along the Nordhaus trade-off justi es this kind of intervention.
III. Under-provision
One of the disadvantages of adversarial legal proceedings such as the one brought by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) against Napster is that they generate assertions that can live like urban legends, long after the proceeding itself is over. One such claim is that weaker property rights will actually increase the provision of new music.
It is true that, in some situations, downstream sharing can increase pro ts (see e.g., Hal Varian, 2000) . As a result, rms will sometimes encourage sharing, as movie studios did for rentals of videotapes. This kind of argument, however, cannot justify weaker property rights that encourage sharing that copyright-holders want to prevent.
Neither side in the Napster case produced convincing evidence about the effect that lesharing had on sales of CDs. The economic expert who testi ed on behalf of Napster argued that, because it let potential buyers sample music before buying, it increased sales. The court adopted the sensible position that, if sampling would help CD sales, the recording industry could deploy its own system for downloading songs. It also found that, regardless of any effects on sales of CDs, widespread user-to-user sharing could prevent music companies from being able to charge for downloads of MP3-encoded versions of its products.
If music-sharing reduces the revenue that the music industry collects relative to what it could collect, it follows that the diversity of music offered will be lower. Even if the industry were suf ciently concentrated to earn substantial ex ante rents, individual rms still have to make decisions about whether the revenue from a new recording justi es the investment required to produce it. In a world with much more musicsharing, rms would still cultivate the next boy band to replace *NSYNC and the next nymph to replace Britney Spears. These are not the marginal projects. But it might not be able to justify the kind of expense that went into the decadelong effort to select, remix, and remaster unreleased recordings from the 1960's by the Buffalo Spring eld. Fans might never have been able to hear Neil Young on vocal and acoustic guitar singing "Out of My Mind," accompanied only by Steve Stills and Richie Furray singing harmony. (Full disclosure: I do listen to Neil Young. Published reports suggest that he does not like Napster.)
IV. Monopoly Distortions
Even if le-sharing will reduce revenue for the music industry and thereby reduce the variety of musical recordings, this need not cause a net reduction in consumer welfare. The substantial markup of price over marginal cost made possible by effective copyright protection creates deadweight losses that sharing can avoid. Absent sharing, the cost for someone who wants to listen to "Without Expression" from Terry Reid's 1968 debut album is between $15 and $20. The cost for Spirit's 1976 studio recording of "Like a Rolling Stone" is far higher because the CD is no longer available for sale. However, anyone with an Internet connection can nd and download either song in minutes. (Full disclosure: I look but do not touch.)
The explosion in music-and video-sharing since 1999 suggests that the demand for music is very responsive to price. A crude estimate suggests that the welfare loss created by the excess of price over marginal cost could be comparable to total revenue for the recording industry.
The statistical samples taken by an expert for the RIAA suggest that, during an unspeci ed week prior to June 2000, Napster users downloaded 140 million songs, which would imply about 560 million songs per month. This estimate is already large, but it comes before a period of rapid growth for Napster. Using representative panels of users, Media Metrix estimated that the number of unique Napster users in the United States grew from 1. Suppose that, in coming years, unrestricted music downloads continue at the pace of 1.5 billion per month or 18 billion per year. Based on the evidence to date, the vast majority of music downloads are not directly substituting for purchases of traditional recordings and, rather, represent new consumption units for listeners. Worldwide sales did fall by about 250 million units in the rst half of 2001 compared to the rst half of 2000, but part of the fall could have been due to the economic slowdown.
Because users can download individual songs rather than full albums, a downloaded track is most comparable to a CD single. In the United States in 2000, CD singles sold for about $4. If the value of the rst downloaded track is the $4 cost of a single and the value of the last downloaded track is $0, a simple straight-line approximation implies that the additional consumer surplus generated by music-sharing, $36 billion (5 $2 per track 3 1.5 billion tracks per month 3 12 months), is nearly equal to the $37 billion in worldwide revenue collected by the music industry. The deadweight loss can exceed revenue because the cost of distributing music through traditional channels is so much higher than through le downloads.
V. The Appropriate Policy Response to Technological Change
To the extent that judges and legislators are guided by welfare analysis, they should respond cautiously to the growth of music-sharing. It will probably reduce the variety of music that is released by rms in the music business, but the magnitude of this effect is unknown and could be small. New business models to support music might emerge. Even in the unlikely event that revenue from sales of recordings goes to zero, new musicians will surely release free recordings to promote themselves, enticed by such existing opportunities for generating revenue as endorsements or live performances. On the other side of the balance, music-sharing will offer bene ts for consumers that could be large. Existing rms will lobby vigorously to prevent a transfer from them to consumers, but economists should stand ready to explain that the policy goal should be to maximize consumer welfare, not such popular proxies as "exports" or "industry revenues."
Courts might reasonably interpret existing copyright laws to mean that they should enjoin rms that facilitate le-sharing. But if, as seems likely, these efforts do not stop the diffusion of user-to-user exchanges, there is no clear economic justi cation for the legislative changes proposed in the SSSCA, changes that would hobble the development of all digital devices and the software they run. Music may be a negligibly small part of the world economy, but information technology is not. Imagine how much slower the pace of technological change in information technology would have been if no new device or software could be sold without a sign-off from the Secretary of Commerce and the RIAA. At an even broader level, giving an industry veto power over new technologies that threaten its current business model would set a very dangerous publicpolicy precedent.
If, with the passage of time, under-provision of music looms as a serious social problem, the appropriate policy response would be to nd a more ef cient way to provide incentives for new recordings. Current copyright law means that recordings are nanced, in effect, by a commodity tax with the tax revenue owing directly to the producing rm in proportion to the number of copies that it sells. The theory of optimal taxation suggests that this is not an ef cient arrangement. If an album can be downloaded at a cost of less than $0.15 and sells for $15, this implies a commodity tax rate of 10,000 percent. More importantly, as technology advances, skyrocketing compliance costs will cause much larger social loses.
As Steven Shavell and Tanguy van Ypersele (2001) argue, it is economically and technically feasible to design a system that uses general tax revenue to reward people who produce such goods as musical recordings. The rewards could be proportional to the number of copies consumers select, so that market demand still allocates funds between alternative artists and recordings. These rewards could exist in parallel with the existing system of sales of recordings. Such a system would leave the total quantity of funding partially under political control, and as with any government funding or regulatory system, it would create the risk of capture by special-interest groups. However, the same disadvantages apply to any intrusive legislation designed to force compliance with the existing copyright system. Direct funding would arguably be more transparent and less subject to political abuse than hidden restrictions that slow the pace of technological change in the information-technology industry.
It is an open question whether the economic bene ts of government incentives for the production of musical recordings would outweigh the potential political harms. There is, however, no urgent need for a decision. New incentives could easily be introduced in the future. Even in a worst case in which the government takes no action and all of the traditional music rms go out of business, the net harm to the economy in the United States or the rest of the world would be trivial.
Economic analysis of these issues still matters because other nonrival goods, the ones that drive human progress, are far more important than musical recordings. Governments throughout the world have mechanisms for subsidizing the production of nonrival goods, the most important of which are direct subsidies for the production of research results and indirect subsidies via educational systems that produce the human capital used to produce nonrival goods. Nonetheless, the production of such critical nonrival goods as pharmaceuticals and network protocols still suffer from serious problems. An example where under-provision might really matter lies in the drawn-out effort to revise the IP protocol on which the entire Internet is based, an effort that is being led by many volunteers who do the work of the informal Internet Engineering Task Force. (On the new version of the IP protocol, see the volume edited by Scott Brander and Allison Mankin [1996] . For a discussion of mechanisms that could avoid monopoly price distortions on pharmaceuticals, see Michael Kremer [1998] .)
The standard textbook answer, that the government should provide public goods and the private sector should provide private goods, entirely misses the subtlety and importance of the challenge and opportunity we face. If anything speci c emerges from court battles and lobbying efforts over the future of the music business, one can hope that it is a broader and more thoughtful public discussion of alternative mechanisms for producing and distributing nonrival goods.
